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Money illusion and the long-run Phillips
curve in staggered wage-setting models
Abstract
We consider the e¤ect of money illusion - dened referring to Stevens
ratio estimation function - on the long-run Phillips curve in an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model of sticky wages. We show that if households
under-perceive real economic variables, negative money non-superneutralities
will become more severe. On the contrary, if households over-perceive real
variables, positive money non-superneutralities will arise. We also provide
a welfare analysis of our results and we show that they are robust to the
inclusion of varying capital into the model. Firms(over-)under-perception
of the real prices of production inputs (strengthens) weakens negative money
non-superneutralities. In an appendix, we investigate how money illusion
a¤ects the short-run e¤ects of a monetary shock.
Keywords: Phillips curve, ination, nominal inertia, monetary policy,
dynamic general equilibrium, money illusion, Stevensratio estimation func-
tion.
JEL classication code: E3, E20, E40, E50.
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1 Introduction
Money illusion has recently attracted renewed attention by the economics
profession - see for instance the literature quoted in Fehr and Tyran (2001,
2007), which developed an experimental approach to the issue, or Cannon
and Cipriani (2006), which assessed its empirical relevance. The aim of this
paper is to study how it a¤ects the long-run connection between output and
ination within a DSGE model, where, similarly to the relevant literature,
we dene the long-run as the steady-state, namely a condition characterized
by the absence of temporary shocks2.
The way we model money illusion here builds on Stevens (1946, 1951),
which has been at the centre of an extensive literature surveyed for instance
in Graham (1958), Anderson (1970), Schepard (1981), Luce and Krumhansl
(1988) and Michell (1999).
We consider money illusion a biased subjective way economic agents have
to evaluate real variables. Suppose an individual receives two pieces of infor-
mation: his/her nominal wage, W , and the general level of prices; P . S/he
will have to estimate her/his real wage as a ratio of the two above on the basis
of her/his ratio estimation function F = f(W;P ). Stevens conjectured that
subjective values are powers of real values, so that Stevensratio estimation
function f(W;P ) can be written as:
2The analysis of the transitional dynamics of the system is tackled in the Appendix.
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f(W;P ) =

W
P

Such a distortion could arise for at least two reasons. Economic agents are
often found to evaluate economic magnitudes combining real and nominal
assessments, given that they have a nominal anchor and, at the same time,
they are aware that nominal and real values di¤er (Shar et al., 1997). Fur-
thermore, following Pelham et al. (1994), there might be a numerosity e¤ect,
whereby people sometimes judge quantity on the basis of the number of units
into which a stimulus is divided without fully considering other important
variables - on this point see, for instance, Wertenbroch et al. (2007) and the
literature quoted therein3.
We nest Stevensoriginal idea in an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model of sticky wages with trend ination. We do so and we assume that
agents do not have other behavioral/informational imperfections because
only by observing money illusion in isolation from other factors one can
properly assess its implications. For this very reason, it seems advisable to
consider householdsand rmsmoney illusion separately.
The e¤ect of trend ination on output in New-Keynesian models has been
the subject of a number of studies by now. Pioneering contributions on this
issue were King and Wolman (1996) and Ascari (1998). The former study
considers a model with a shopping time technology and it obtains a num-
3Both these mechanisms tend to rule out the possibility for economic agents to learn
the actual value of real variables.
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ber of di¤erent results, among which there is that long-run ination reduces
rmsmarkup, boosting the level of output. Ascari (1998), instead, shows
that in wage-staggering models money can have considerable negative non-
superneutralities once not considering restrictively simple utility and produc-
tion functions. Deveraux and Yetman (2002) focused on a menu cost model.
An analysis of dynamic general equilibrium models under di¤erent contract
schemes in presence of trend ination was o¤ered in Ascari (2004). Gra-
ham and Snower (2004), instead, examined the microeconomic mechanisms
underlying this class of models. In presence of Taylor wage staggering, in
a monopolistically competitive labour market, they highlight three channels
through which ination a¤ects output: employment cycling, labour supply
smoothing and time discounting. The rst one consists in rms continuously
shifting labour demand from one cohort to the other according to their real
wage. Given that di¤erent labour kinds are imperfect substitutes, this gen-
erates ine¢ ciencies and tends to create a negative ination-output nexus.
The second one is that households demand a higher wage in presence of
employment cycling given that they would prefer a smoother working time,
decreasing labor supply and aggregate output. Finally under time discount-
ing the contract wage depends more on the current (lower) level of prices
than on the future (higher) level of prices and, therefore - over the contract
period - the real wage will be lower the greater is the ination rate, spurring
labour demand and aggregate output. The time discounting e¤ect dominates
at lower ination rates, while the other two e¤ects at higher ination rates,
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producing a hump-shaped long-run Phillips curve. The aim of this paper is
to challenge the concept of the NAIRU and the possibility to identify demand
and supply shocks assuming the former ones to be temporary and the latter
ones to be permanent.
Graham and Snower (2004) was extended in a number of di¤erent di-
rections. Graham and Snower (2008) showed that under hyperbolic time
discounting positive money non-superneutralities are more sizeable than un-
der exponential discounting. Vaona and Snower (2007, 2008) showed how the
shape of the long-run Phillips curve depends on the shape of the production
function. Finally, Vaona (2010) extended the model by Graham and Snower
(2004) from the ination-output domain to the ination-real growth one.
The present contribution shows that the shape of the long-run Phillips
curve changes under di¤erent degrees of money illusion. We do so by rst
assuming rms not to be subjected to money illusion as reminiscence of
Friedman (1968). However, given that Shar et al. (1997) found that even
rmsdecisions can be a¤ected by money illusion, we deal with this case at
a later stage.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates our
baseline model. We then move to its calibration and solution. Section 4
sets out our results and their underlying intuition, also providing a welfare
analysis of theirs. Section 5 extends the model by considering varying cap-
ital. Section 6 considers the case of rmsmoney illusion. The last section
summarizes our ndings and concludes. As mentioned above, in the appen-
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dix we tackle the issue of how (either householdsor rms) money illusion
a¤ects the impact of a temporary monetary shock on the model, given that,
even if demand shocks cannot be identied on the basis of their transience, it
will be interesting to study how transient demand shocks a¤ect an economy.
2 The baseline model
2.1 Firmscost minimization problem and the govern-
ment
The model here presented is inspired to those by Ascari (1998) and Graham
and Snower (2004). Firms populating the nal perfectly competitive product
market produce an homogeneous output and they minimize their total real
cost subject to their production function
min
nt(h)
1Z
h=0
Wt(h)
Pt
nt(h)dh
s:t: yt = nt =
Z 1
0
nt (h)
n 1
n dh
 n
n 1
where Wt(h) and nt(h) are respectively the nominal wage and the working
time of household h, yt is output, n is the elasticity of substitution among
di¤erent labour types and Pt is the general level of prices, which, given that
we assume perfect competition in the nal product market, equals the price
of the homogenous nal product.
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Taking rst order conditions one can obtain the following equations
nt (h) =

Wt(h)=Pt
n
 n
nt (1)
n;t =
8<:
1Z
0

Wt(h)
Pt
1 n
dh
9=;
1
1 n
(2)
where (1) is the demand for labour services of household h and (2) is an
aggregate real wage index, whereby n;t - the Lagrangian multiplier - can be
renamed Wt=Pt.
The government rebates its seigniorage proceeds to households by means
of lump-sum transfers, Tt (h). Therefore:
1Z
0
Tt (h)
Pt
dh =
1Z
0
Mt (h)
Pt
dh 
1Z
0
Mt 1 (h)
Pt
dh
where Mt (h) is money holdings of household h at time t.
2.2 Householdsmaximization problem
Households maximize their discounted expected utility
max
fct+i(h);Wt+Ni(h);Bt+i(h);Mt+i(h)g
1X
j=0
(j+1)N 1X
i=jN
E
 
iU
(
ct+i (h) ; nt+i (h) ;

Mt+i(h)
Pt+i
)!
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subject to a series of income constraints perceived as follows
ct+i (h) =

Wt+i (h)
Pt+i

nt+i(h) +

Tt+i (h)
Pt+i

 

Mt+i (h)
Pt+i

+

Mt+i 1 (h)
Pt+i

 
 

Bt+i(h)
Pt+i

+

Bt+i 1(h)
Pt+i
t+i

(3)
where  is the discount factor, E is the expectation operator, U is the utility
function, c is consumption, B are private bond holdings and  is the nom-
inal interest rate. The presence of  descends from the fact that economic
agents are not able to properly assess real variables. The actual real budget
constraint can be obtained setting  = 1.
Further constraints derive form the demand for labour services (1). Note
that, in this section, labour demand is not a¤ected by money illusion, notwith-
standing that it involves the computation of a ratio of two nominal variables.
This is so for two reasons. First, by setting di¤erent wages households can, in
principle, observe the actual amount of working time that rms demand, so
it is not plausible to think that they have a misperception of labour demand.
In other words, labour demand is not computed by households, but by rms,
which in this section are not subjected to money illusion. Second, this is in
accord with the very concept of money illusion. As explained by Shar et al.
(1997) and as briey mentioned above, money illusion arises because agents
have a nominal anchor, for example their colleagueswages. It is therefore
the correct awareness of wage di¤erentials that produces a distorted percep-
tion of real variables. For these reasons, it seems appropriate not to consider
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any misperception in Wt+i(h)
Wt+i
in the present section.
The rst order condition with respect to Wt+Ni(h) turns out to be par-
ticularly important for the solution of the model
N 1X
i=0
E
(
i jUn ()j ( 1) ( n)

Wt+i (h)
Wt+i
 n 1 1
Wt+i
yt+i
)
=
N 1X
i=0
E
(
t+i(h)
i (n   )

1
Pt+i

yt+i

1
Wt+i
 n
Wt+i (h)
( n 1)
)
(4)
where Un () is the rst derivative of U () with respect to nt+i (h).
Keeping in mind that Wt+i (h) is constant through the contract period,
one can substitute (2) into (4) to obtain
N 1X
i=0
E

i jUn ()j ( 1) ( n)nt+i (h)

=
N 1X
i=0
E
(
t+i(h)
i (n   )

Wt+i (h)
Pt+i

nt+i (h)
)
(5)
Given that households are symmetrical and have the same rst order condi-
tion for consumption
Uc [ct+i (h) ; ; ] = t+i(h) (6)
they will all consume the same quantity of the nal good. So aggregating
one has:
1Z
0
ct(h)dh = ct (7)
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However, in each period, households belonging to di¤erent cohorts have
di¤erent income levels. This implies that, following Ascari (1998), households
exchange bonds to keep their consumption constant4. Therefore, considering
that the total number of households is normalized to 1 and that there exist
1
N
households in each cohort i; one has that
ct =
N 1X
i=0
Wt(i)
Pt
nt (i)
N
(8)
A rst implication of equation (8) is that even though agents do not
have a correct perception of their individual budget constraints, these hold
anyway. This is thanks to the working of the market. Agents choose their
preferred quantity of consumption according to (6) and they buy it spending
Ptct: If they have some savings - because their nominal income exceeds their
expenditure - they will use these savings to buy bonds. If, on the other hand,
their nominal income is lower than their expenditure, they will sell bonds.
All these operations do not involve ratios of nominal variables and so they
are not a¤ected by money illusion.
One further possible interpretation of equations (8) and (7) is that, in
4Under this respect and regarding equation (3), the present model departs from the one
by Graham and Snower (2004), where no assumption is made regarding asset markets (see
note 5 at p. 13, where it is also admitted that their model is not suitable for analysing
o¤-steady state dynamics as we do in the Appendix). Consumption is thought, there,
to be constant and equal to a fraction of the discounted labour income over the contract
period (see equation 12). However, it is left unspecied, there, how, at the beginning of the
contract period, households with a low real wage can a¤ord the same level of consumption
as households with a high real wage and what happens to the savings of households with
a high real wage. Furthermore, the assumption of complete asset markets is customary in
the new keyensian literature about nominal rigidities.
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the present "right-to-manage" model, households set their wage on the basis
of their distorted perceptions and rms set working hours on the basis of
the wage set by households. The production process takes then place and,
nally, households pool their income before consuming all the same quantity
of output. This is why no distortion a¤ects equation (8) and why, upon
consuming, the binding budget constraint is (3) with  = 15.
A second implication of equation (8) is that (5) can be rewritten as
N 1X
i=0
E

i jUn ()j nnt+i (h)

= (n   )N
N 1X
i=0
E
264 i

Wt+i(h)
Pt+i

nt+i (h)PN 1
i=0

Wt+i(h)
Pt+i

nt+i (h)
375
(9)
which implies that money illusion a¤ects labour supply and, as explained
below, the long-run Phillips curve.
3 Calibration and solution of the baseline model
We specify the utility function as follows
U () = log ct+i (h) + & [1  nt (h)]
1 
1   + V
(
Mt+i(h)
Pt+i
)
(10)
5The author is indebted to Paolo Bertoletti for suggesting this further interpretation.
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Suppose  > 0, (9) will become
N 1X
i=0
E

i [1  nt+i (h)]  nnt+i (h) &
	
= (n   )N
N 1X
i=0
E
264 i

Wt+i(h)
Pt+i

nt+i (h)PN 1
i=0

Wt+i(h)
Pt+i

nt+i (h)
375
(11)
The equilibrium for this model is a sequence fct;Wt(h); t; nt(h); nt; yt; tg
satisfying householdsutility maximization and rmsprot maximization.
However, we show below for the steady state that equations (1), (2) and (11)
constitute an autonomous system in W

W
; n0 and y, where W

W
and n0 are the
relative real wage of cohort zero and its labour supply respectively.
Consider, rst, that the ination rate (equal to the growth rate of money)
is ; second, that, being the nal product market perfectly competitive,
Wt = Pt and, nally, that, after (1), the labour supply of cohorts j and j+1
are connected in the following way:
nj
nj+1
=  w
On these grounds, it is possible to solve the sums in (11) and (2) to obtain
N 1X
i=0
i

1  n0ni
 
n0
ni =
n   
n&
N
1  N(n )N
1  (n )
1  (n 1)
1  (n 1)N

W 
W
( 1)
(12)
with
W 
W
=

1
N
1  N(n 1)
1  n 1
 1
n 1
(13)
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(12) can be solved numerically for n0. Aggregate output can be easily ob-
tained by substituting n0 and (13) into (1).
Further notice that the rst order condition with respect to bonds implies
that in steady state
 =

Pt+i
Pt+i+1
t+i
 
 [R]  (14)
where R equals 1 plus the real interest rate.
We calibrate parameters as follows: N = 2,  = 2; n = 5 and the real
interest rate to be 4% in steady state, which means that the discount factor
is pinned down by (14). Sensitivity analyses regarding these parameters were
extensively discussed and performed by Graham and Snower (2004, 2008). It
is o¤ered there also a discussion of the reasons why Taylor contracts can be
preferable to other kinds of wage contracts and why inserting wage indexation
may not be interesting. Furthermore, we stick to Taylor contracts because
Ascari (2004) showed that they are less sensitive to trend ination than Calvo
contracts. These issues will not receive further attention here.
Instead we focus on : Notice that  < n not to have a negative mark-up
of the reset wage over the ratio between the weighted marginal disutilities
from labour and marginal utilities from consumption over the contract pe-
riod - see equation (39). The two theoretical arguments advanced at the
beginning of the present article for introducing  in our model cannot o¤er
much guidance regarding its value. Resorting to the literature on pay sat-
isfaction and the subjective value of money will not help either, given that
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there are studies - like Giles and Barrett (1971) and Heneman et al. (1997) -
that would favour a value of  greater than one, but there are also studies -
like Brandstätter and Brandstätter (1996) and Worley et al. (1992) - which
would favour a value of  smaller than one. Therefore, we o¤er illustrative
results for  = 0:7 and  = 4:9 - which is very close to n.
4 Results, intuition and welfare analysis of
the baseline model
Figure 1 compares the long-run Phillips curves for  = 0:7 and for  = 1;
while Figure 2 those for  = 4:9 and for  = 1: In the rst case the long-run
Phillips curve in presence of money illusion lies below the one without money
illusion, while in the second case the contrary happens. To appreciate the
intuition underlying this result the reader should consider equations (14) and
(11). For a given real interest rate,  < 1 rises the discount factor dampening
the time discounting e¤ect. Furthermore, it lowers agents perception of
their labour income reducing labour supply.  > 1 instead produces opposite
e¤ects. However, this does not imply that output will grow even in presence
of hyperination, given that, as it is possible to see in Figure 2, for high
ination rates positive non-superneutralities fade away (turning in the end
into negative non-superneutralities).
Building on Woodford (1998) among others, we can specify agentswel-
fare, W, assuming the weight of money holdings to be so small to be negli-
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gible:
W =
1X
j=0
j
(
log ct+j   & [1  nt+j (h)]
1 
1  
)
(15)
which, after Graham and Snower (2004, p.23), in steady state can be re-
written as
W = 1
1   log y   &
1
1  N
N 1X
l=0
l

1  n0nl
1 
1  
Table 1 shows that, varying ,W behaves in a similar way to output. Under
wage-staggering and  = 4:9 welfare increases with the money growth rate,
levelling o¤ at high ination rates. For  = 0:7 welfare decreases as the
ination rate increases.
The next section introduces varying capital in the model.
5 The model with varying capital
5.1 Householdsmaximization problem
Households maximize their discounted expected utility
max
fct+i(h);Wt+Ni(h);Bt+i(h);Mt+i(h);Kt+i(h)g
1X
j=0
(j+1)N 1X
i=jN
iU
(
ct+i (h) ; nt+i (h) ;

Mt+i(h)
Pt+i
)
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subject to a series of income constraints perceived as follows
ct+i (h) + it+i(h) =

Wt+i (h)
Pt+i

nt+i(h) +

Tt+i (h)
Pt+i

 

Mt+i (h)
Pt+i

+

Mt+i 1 (h)
Pt+i

 
 

Bt+i(h)
Pt+i

+

Bt+i 1(h)
Pt+i
t+i

+

kt+i (h)
Pt+i

Kt+i(h)
where K is capital, i investment and kt+i is the nominal rental rate of capital.
Further constraints derive form the demand for labour services (1). Dening
the capital depreciation rate as , the law of motion of capital is
Kt+i(h) = it+i(h) + (1  )Kt+i 1(h)
which can be substituted into the budget constraint to obtain
ct+i (h) +Kt+i(h) =

Wt+i (h)
Pt+i

nt+i(h) +

Tt+i (h)
Pt+i

 

Mt+i (h)
Pt+i

+

Mt+i 1 (h)
Pt+i

 
 

Bt+i(h)
Pt+i

+

Bt+i 1(h)
Pt+i
t+i

+

kt+i (h)
Pt+i

Kt+i 1(h) +
+ (1  )Kt+i 1(h)
Taking the rst-order derivative with respect to Kt+i(h) one has
t+i (h)  E
"


kt+i+1
Pt+i+1

t+i+1 (h)
#
  E [ (1  )t+i+1 (h)] = 0 (16)
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5.2 Firmscost minimization problem and the govern-
ment
We adopt a two-stage budgeting approach after Chambers (1988, pp. 112-
113) and Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (2002, pp. 360-363). In the rst stage
rms choose the amount of each labour kind as in section 2.1. In the second
stage, they minimize their total costs by choosing their preferred amounts of
capital and of the aggregate labour input as follows6
min
Kt;nt
kt
Pt
Kt +
Wt
Pt
nt
s:t: yt = K

t n
1 
t (17)
Solving this problem one has that
Kt = MCt
yt
kt
Pt
(18)
nt = MCt (1  ) ytWt
Pt
(19)
MCt =
 
kt
Pt

! 
Wt
Pt
1  
!1 
(20)
where MCt is the real marginal cost at time t. Prot maximization fur-
ther implies the price of the nal product to be equal to the rmsnominal
6We did not insert an index for rms as they are symmetrical and their number is
normalized to one.
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marginal cost, which leads us to the following equation
Pt =

kt


Wt
1  
1 
(21)
5.3 Model solution and results
The equilibrium for this model is a sequence
n
t; ct; nt(h); nt; t; t; Kt;
Wt
Pt
; Wt(h)
Pt
; yt,
kt
Pt
o
- where t = PtPt 1 - satisfying householdsutility maximization and rms
prot maximization. For K and c, we could drop the h index because house-
holds are symmetrical with respect to their consumption and investment
choices.
In steady state (16) implies
 
R   1 +  = k
P

(22)
In words, agents equate their perception of the real interest rate to their
perception of the gross real rental rate of capital. P can be normalized to 1
and (22) together with (21) can be used to ndW . Having the ratio between
the aggregate wage index and the gross rental rate of capital, (19) and (18)
can be used to nd K=n, and, by means of the production function (17),
y=n. Further consider that in steady state i = K, therefore
c
n
=

K
n

  

K
n

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In the right-hand side of equation (5) divide and multiply by nt+i to
obtain
N 1X
i=0
E

i jUn ()j ( 1) ( n)nt+i (h)

=
N 1X
i=0
E
8><>:
i (n   )
h
Wt+i(h)
Pt+i
i
nt+i(h)
nt+i
ct+i
nt+i
9>=>;
(23)
Specifying the utility function as in (10), one can nd that, considering
varying capital, (12) turns out to be
N 1X
i=0
i

1  n0ni
 
n0
ni =
n   
n&
n
c
1  N(n )N
1  (n )

W 
W
 w
W 
(24)
which can be solved numerically for n0. With n0 at hand, on can easily
recover rst n by using (1) and then all the steady state values of the other
variables of model.
Figure (3) shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of variable
capital.  > 1 reinforces positive money non-superneutralities, while for
 < 1 the opposite holds true.
6 Money illusion in rmsdecisions
Up to this point, we have assumed that money illusion a¤ects households and
not rms. In this section, instead, we explore how the long-run Phillips curve
is a¤ected by money illusion when it pertains to rmsand not households
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behavior. In so doing we stick to the model with varying capital. Under
this assumption  = 0 and the rst stage cost minimization problem of rms
turns out to be
min
nt(h)
1Z
h=0

Wt(h)
Pt
f
nt(h)dh
s:t: nt =
Z 1
0
nt (h)
n 1
n dh
 n
n 1
The second stage cost minimization problem instead is
min
Kt;nt

kt
Pt
f
Kt +

Wt
Pt
f
nt
s:t: yt = K

t n
1 
t
where f is the rmscounterpart of :
The new rst order conditions corresponding to equations (1)   (2) and
(18)-(20) can be easily computed, once recalling that under rmsmoney
illusion one has that n;t =

Wt
Pt

. Specically the counterpart of equation
(1) for the present model is
nt (h) =

Wt(h)=Pt
n
 fn
nt (25)
Prot maximization still implies that the price level is equal to the nominal
marginal cost and therefore that the real marginal cost is equal to one for
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f 6= 0. Given that the product market is perfectly competitive, prots will
still be zero. The quantities of production inputs will be chosen on the basis
of the distorted rmsperceptions. The solution procedure is similar to the
one illustrated in the previous section. Equation (24) changes to
N 1X
i=0
i

1  n0fni
 
n0
fni =
n   1
n&
n
c
1  N(fn 1)N
1  (fn 1)

W 
W
 fw
W 
(26)
Figure 4 sets out our results. f > 1 reinforces negative money non-
superneutralities, while for f < 1 the opposite holds true. In order to
understand the economic intuition, it is possible to inspect equations (25)
and (26) and to see that rmsmoney illusion has a similar e¤ect to an
increase in the elasticity of substitution of di¤erent labour kinds, which was
analysed in Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004). This increases
employment cycling and, also due to the labour supply smoothing e¤ect,
leads to the results showed in Figure 4.
7 Conclusions
To conclude this paper shows how the long-run ination-output nexus be-
haves in presence of agents mis-perceiving real economic variables. House-
holdsunder-perception reduces labour supply and time discounting leading
to more negative money non-superneutralities. Householdsover-perception,
instead, boosts labour supply and time discounting leading to more positive
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money non-superneutralities. These results hold true even inserting varying
capital in our model. Once considering rmsmoney illusion, we found that
(over-)under-perception (strengthens)weakens negative money non-superneutralities.
Also the long-run Phillips curve is more sensitive to rms rather than to
householdsmoney illusion. In the Appendix, we treat how a temporary
shock in money growth a¤ects our model for di¤erent degrees of money illu-
sion.
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8 Appendix
In this Appendix we consider the impact of a temporary monetary shock on
the economy. We stick to the varying capital model. We rst analyse the
case of householdsmoney illusion and then that of rmsmoney illusion.
Following Edge (2002) money growth is assumed to evolve according to the
process
t = ()
1   t 1 exp(t)
where t is a random shock and  an autoregressive parameter, that we set
equal to 0.57 after Ascari (2004). We also set the steady state money growth
rate, , to 1%. Similarly to Edge (2001), the other equations of the system
are
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where (33) comes from the ratio of the rst order condition for money hold-
ings at time t and at time t  1.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of output to a monetary shock for
di¤erent values of . Similarly to Edge (2002) we normalized them on the
basis of the impact value of output for  = 1. As it is possible to see, money
illusion does not alter output persistence. It only changes the impact value of
output as a greater value of  reduces it. To appreciate an intuition for this
result consider the equation for the nominal reset wage, that can be obtained
from the equation (37)-(38)
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As noted by Ascari (2000) among others, the nominal reset wage is a mark-
up over the ratio between the weighted marginal disutilities from labour and
marginal utilities from consumption over the contract period. Overperception
of real variables reduces the impact of a monetary shock because agents
believe their real wage is higher than what it is in reality and so they change
their nominal wage by a lesser amount. This is the meaning of the exponent
of 1

in the right hand side of equation (39). The opposite holds true for
underperception of real variables, which implies an over-reaction by agents
to monetary shocks. Agentsover(under)-reaction produces also over(under)-
reaction of output. This intuition is conrmed by the behavior of the real
wage of the resetting cohort in our model. Similarly to Huang and Liu (2002),
after a monetary shock it declines, however for  = 1:1 it does so by 45%
less than for  = 1, while for  = 0:9 by 66% more than in absence of money
illusion.
Under rmsmoney illusion the system of equations is similar to (27)  
(38) with the exceptions that  = 1 and that equations (27)  (32) now are
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Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of output to a monetary shock for
di¤erent values of f . Similarly to above, we normalized them on the basis
of the impact value of output for f = 1. Once again money illusion does
not alter output persistence. It only changes the impact value of output as a
greater value of f increases it. To appreciate an intuition for this result con-
sider that Huang and Liu (2002, 430) write that, in wage staggering models,
wage-setting decisions are dominated by the labour supply smoothing e¤ect.
As a consequence, wage setting cohorts, in order to dampen uctuations in
their working hours, rise their wage less than ination leading to a decline
in their real wage. For f > 1 rms overperceive wage di¤erences leading to
greater uctuations in the working hours of the various cohorts. As a con-
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sequence the wage setting cohort underreact to a monetary shock leading to
a greater decline in their real wage and to a greater output expansion. The
contrary happens for f < 1. This intuition is conrmed by the fact that
under f = 1:1 the real wage of the resetting cohort declines by 47% more
than for f = 1: On the contrary for f = 0:9 the real wage of the resetting
cohort declines by 45% less than for f = 1:
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Table 1 - Percentage deviation from the welfare level with exible wages
Money growth rate  = 4:9  = 0:7
2.5 0.04% -0.24%
5 0.08% -0.96%
10 0.12% -3.60%
15 0.13% -7.44%
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Figure 1: The long-run Phillips curve for  = 0:7 and  = 1.
34
Figure 2: The long-run Phillips curve for  = 4:9 and  = 1.
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Figure 3: The long-run Phillips curve for di¤erent values of  and varying
capital.
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Figure 4: The long-run Phillips curve for di¤erent values of f and varying
capital.
37
Figure 5: Normalized impulse response functions of output after a monetary
shock for di¤erent values of . (The normalization base is the impact value
for  = 1).
38
Figure 6: Normalized impulse response functions of output after a monetary
shock for di¤erent values of f . (The normalization base is the impact value
for f = 1).
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